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Introduction
The consensus among like-mindednational legal systems regarding standards for the
court supervision of arbitral awards excludes the judicial review of the merits of awards. The
1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration,1 along with the 1958 New
York Arbitration Convention,2 both an integral part of the world law of arbitration, codify widely
accepted grounds for the recognition and enforcement of international arbitral awards. They
implicitly exclude any judicial reassessment of the arbitrators’ decision on the merits.3

1

A

The Uncitral Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, adopted June 21, 1985, codifies the modern

transborder consensus on international commercial arbitration. U.N. Doc. A/40/17/Annex I (1985). It incorporates
a liberal approach to the regulation of arbitration, acknowledging the central significance of party autonomy in
matters of arbitration. It has served as the basis for statutory enactments on arbitration in a number of U.S. states
and in a multitude of foreign countries.
See Article 35 of the Model Law.

See First Working Group Report A/CN.9/216 (Mar. 23, 1982);

Commission Report A/40/17 (Aug. 21, 1985); Seventh Secretariate Note, A/CN.9/264, Art. 35, para. 3, p. 1040
(Mar. 25, 1986); Fifth Working Group Report A/CN.9/246, at 1032-1033 (Mar. 6, 1984). See also I. DORE, THE
UNCITRAL FRAMEWORK FOR ARBITRATION IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE (1993); H. HOLTZMANN & J.
NEHHAUS, A GUIDE TO THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY AND COMMENTARY (1989); Aron Broches, Commentary on the UNCITRAL Model Law, in P. SANDERS & A.
JAN VAN DEN BERG, eds., INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1984; supp. Jan. 11, 1990).

2

Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, opened for signature, 10 June 1958,

21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, codified at 9 U.S. C.A. 201-208 (1970) (hereinafter the New York Arbitration
Convention).

The literature on the Convention is voluminous.

See, e.g., H. SMIT & V. PECHOTA, eds.,

COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION—AN INTERNATIONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY 29-39 (3d ed. 2004).
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contrary policy would have undermined the independence of arbitration and its viability as a
remedy. Both transborder instruments confine judicial oversight to an evaluation of the fairness
of the arbitral proceedings.4
Arbitrating parties must have had the legal capacity to agree to arbitration. They must
have been provided with notice of the proceedings and a reasonable opportunity to make their
case.

Arbitrators must rule exclusively on matters submitted.

Rulings that exceed the

arbitrators’ jurisdiction can lead to the vacatur of awards or their partial enforcement if the
exuberant determinations are excised. Also, the arbitral procedure must comport with party
stipulations or with the provisions of the law of the place of arbitration. In such matters,
however, legal regulations are secondary to party agreement. Freedom on contract prevails in
arbitration. Finally, an award that is not final or has been set aside by a court at the place of
arbitration or by a court the national law of which governed the making of the award can be
refused recognition and enforcement in other signatory States.5
In recent transnational arbitral practice, problems have emerged regarding the application
of the setting aside ground. In fact, relevant court determinations have generated a debate.
Espousing a result that intends to support arbitration, courts in France and the United States have

3

See generally Barcelo, Who Decides the Arbitrators’ Jurisdiction? Separability and Competence-Competence in

Transnational Perspective, 36 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 1127 – 1129 (2003). See also generally Carbonneau, The
Exercise of Contract Freedom in the Making of Arbitration Agreements, 36 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 1219 – 1221
(2003).

4

See generally id.

5

See generally Carbonneau, The Exercise of Contract Freedom in Making of Arbitration Agreements, supra note 3,

at 1219 – 1221.

3

enforced awards set aside at the place of rendition,6 ruling—in effect—that nullification in one
jurisdiction does not impede or even impair enforcement in another. A nullified award can still
find a hospitable venue for enforcement.

While it gives practical effect to transborder

arbitrations, such a practice strains the applicable law and the assumptions that underline it. In
effect, it undermines international res judicata and the uniform character of the de facto
transborder legal process created by the New York Arbitration Convention. The contrary view—
that annulment in one State invalidates the award in other jurisdictions—avoids the disunifying
impact of forum-shopping for enforcement. Giving wider effect to the setting aside action,
however, reinforces the authority of national law and makes the enforcement of international
arbitral awards less certain. While insularity undermines globalization, disregarding settled
transnational procedures (even dubious ones) can create international chaos. Although incidents
of protectionism may disrupt transborder arbitration, respecting the application and
consequences of the setting aside action is necessary to the continuing viability of the arbitral
process.
Arbitral treaty law also provides for a substantive exception to enforcement on the basis
of inarbitrability and public policy.7 These grounds protect adhering States from fundamental
infringements of their political sovereignty. Despite a sound arbitration, a requested State can
decline to enforce an international arbitral award if its courts determine that the recourse to

6

See, e.g., Gharavi, Enforcing Set Aside Awards: France’s Controversial Steps Beyond the New York Convention, 6

J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 93 (1996); Sampliner, Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards After Annulment in
Their Country of Origin, 11-9 MEALEY’S INTT’L ARB. REP. 22 (1996).
7

See notes 1 and 2, supra, and accompanying text.
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arbitration violates basic jurisdictional boundaries or the award offends the requested State’s
very concept of justice. The defenses of inarbitrability and public policy are meant to apply only
in truly exceptional circumstances. They are intended to express more than mere disagreement
with an award or to act as a means for shielding nationals from commercial accountability.8
Treaty law, therefore, provides that national judiciaries should take only a modest role in
supervising international arbitral awards.

Review of the merits, de novo or otherwise, is

excluded as a matter of essential policy. Arbitrators are the sovereign decision-makers. They,
however, can rule only on matters submitted and must give the parties a reasonable opportunity
to defend themselves and make their case.

The parties also are entitled to notice of the

proceedings. The content of the parties’ agreement governs. The mission of the courts is to
maintain the effectiveness of transborder arbitration and to safeguard its legitimacy by correcting
fundamental abuses.
Increased reference and greater sophistication, however, have generated a tension
between the evolution of the arbitral process and its founding principles. Two developments
have surfaced in U.S. arbitral practice that demonstrate the tension to which creative adaptation
has given rise. Both developments can be present in transborder arbitration and, therefore, are
likely to have a bearing upon international arbitral law. The tension centers upon the proper role
of courts in legal frameworks—domestic and international—that regulate the enforcement of
arbitral awards. It raises the question of whether the rule of contract freedom and the perceived
necessities of the arbitral process can engender results that actually impair the autonomy of
arbitration in relation to courts: First, can contracting parties comm
a nd in an arbitral clause or
submission that courts of enforcement engage in a de novo appellate review of arbitrator rulings

8

See id.

5

on the law? Second, can the contracting parties provide or a court of enforcement order the
rendering arbitral tribunal to clarify an award or parts of it?
In U.S. arbitration law, the development of a right to seek a clarification of an award
arose through judicial rulings rather than statute.9 For example, Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
§11, the relevant provision in the governing statute, does not authorize such an action and, in
fact, implies that it is unavailable and even unlawful.10 The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act
(RUAA) (2000),11 however—the most recent U.S. statutory codification on arbitration—
9

See text at notes 149-181 infra.

10

9 USCA § 11: “In either of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein the award

was made may make an order modifying or correcting the award upon the application of any party to the
arbitration—(a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident material mistake in the
description of any person, thing, or property referred to in the award. (b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a
matter not submitted to them, unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter
submitted. (c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the controversy. The order
may modify and correct the award, so as to effect the intent thereof and promote justice between the parties.”

11

See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Arbitration Act, 2000.

See

generally Andrew Ness, Revised Uniform Arbitration Act of 2000 Makes Only Incremental Changes, 21 CONSTR.
LAW. (No. 4 Fall 2001). “The Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA), promulgated in 1955, gave courts the power to
enforce arbitration agreements and to quickly convert arbitration awards into judgments, often overcoming a long
line of state court precedents to the contrary. Establishing that arbitration agreements were valid, binding and
readily enforceable paved the way for the enormous increase in arbitration's popularity in construction and many
other industries. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws considers the UAA one of its
most successful Uniform Acts, with 35 states adopting the UAA intact and 14 more adopting substantially similar
legislation. Forty-five years after UAA, a five-year effort to update and revise it culminated in the Revised Uniform
Arbitration Act (RUAA), which was given final approval by the National Conference of Commissioners in August
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recognizes an action to clarify an award. RUAA Section 2012 provides that, “On [motion] to an
arbitrator by a party to an arbitration proceeding, the arbitrator may modify or correct an

2000. The RUAA seeks to retain the basic principles of the 1955 UAA while updating it to address the issues arising
in more complex disputes. As most state legislatures are expected to consider adopting the RUAA over the next few
years, construction industry professionals are well-advised to familiarize themselves with its provisions and ponder
how they might affect the arbitration of construction disputes.” See id.

See also 11 WORLD ARB. & MED. REP.

326 (2000); Heinsz, The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act: Modernizing, Revising, and Clarifying Arbitration Law,
[2001] J. DISP. RES. 1; McCabe, Uniformity in ADR: Thoughts on the Uniform Arbitration Act and Uniform
Mediation Act, 3 PEPP. DISP. RES. L.J. 317 (2003).

12

See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Arbitration Act § 20, 2000. (a) On

[motion] to an arbitrator by a party to an arbitration proceeding, the arbitrator may modify or correct an award: (1)
upon a ground stated in Section 24(a)(1) or (3); (2) because the arbitrator has not made a final and definite award
upon a claim submitted by the parties to the arbitration proceeding; or (3) to clarify the award. (b) A [motion] under
subsection (a) must be made and notice given to all parties within 20 days after the movant receives notice of the
award. (c) A party to the arbitration proceeding must give notice of any objection to the [motion] within 10 days
after receipt of the notice. (d) If a [motion] to the court is pending under Section 22, 23, or 24, the court may submit
the claim to the arbitrator to consider whether to modify or correct the award: (1) upon a ground stated in Section
24(a)(1) or (3); (2) because the arbitrator has not made a final and definite award upon a claim submitted by the
parties to the arbitration proceeding; or (3) to clarify the award. (e) An award modified or corrected pursuant to this
section is subject to Sections 19(a), 22, 23, and 24.

Comment: 1. Section 20 provides a mechanism in subsections (a), (b), and (c) for the parties to apply directly to the
arbitrators to modify or correct an award and in subsection (d) for a court to submit an award back to the arbitrators
for a determination whether to modify or correct an award. The situation in subsection (d) would occur if either
party under Section 22, 23, or 24 files a motion with a court within 90 days to confirm, vacate, modify or correct an
award and the court decides to remand the matter back to the arbitrators. The revised alternative is based on the

7

Minnesota version of the UAA. Minn. Stat. Ann. §572.16; see also 710 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/9; Ky. Rev. Stat.
417.130.

Comment 2. Section 20 serves an important purpose in light of the arbitration doctrine of functus officio which is "a
general rule in common law arbitration that when arbitrators have executed their awards and declared their decision
they are functus officio and have no power to proceed further." Mercury Oil Ref. Co. v. Oil Workers, 187 F.2d 980,
983 (10th Cir. 1951); see also International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union 1547 v. City of Ketchikan, Alaska,
805 P.2d 340 (Alaska 1991); Chaco Energy Co. v. Thercol Energy Co., 97 N.M. 127, 637 P.2d 558 (1981). Under
this doctrine when arbitrators finalize an award and deliver it to the parties, they can no longer act on the matter. See
1 Domke on Commercial Arbitration §§22:01, 32:01 (Gabriel M. Wilner, ed. 1996) [hereinafter Domke]. Indeed
because of the functus officio doctrine there is some question whether, in the absence of an authorizing statute, a
court can remand an arbitration decision to the arbitrators who initially heard the matter. 1 Domke §35:03.

Comment 3. The grounds in Section 20(a) and (d) are essentially the same as those in UAA Section 9, which
provides the parties with a limited opportunity to request modification or correction of an arbitration award either (1)
when there is an error as described in Section 24(a)(1) for miscalculation or mistakes in descriptions or in Section
24(a)(3) for awards imperfect in form or (2) "for the purpose of clarifying the award." Chaco Energy Co. v. Thercol
Energy Co., 97 N.M. 127, 637 P.2d 558 (1981) (finding an amended arbitration award for purposes other than those
enumerated in statute is void). Section 20(a)(2) and (d)(2) include an additional ground for modification or
correction that is based on FAA Section 10(a)(4) where an arbitrator's award is either so imperfectly executed or
incomplete that it is questionable whether the arbitrators ruled on a submitted issue. See, e.g., Flexible Mfg. Sys. Pty.
Ltd. v. Super Prods. Corp., 86 F.3d 96 (7th Cir. 1996); Americas Ins. Co. v. Seagull Compania Naviera, S.A., 774
F.2d 64 (2nd Cir. 1986).

Comment 4. The benefit of a provision such as Section 20 is evident in a comparison with the FAA, which has no
similar provision. Under the FAA, there is no statutory authority for parties to request arbitrators to correct or
modify evident errors. Furthermore the FAA has only a limited exception in FAA Section 10(a)(5) for a court to
order a rehearing before the arbitrators when an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required
the award to be issued has not expired. This lack of a statutory basis both for arbitrators to clarify a matter and, in
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award:…to clarify the award.” According to the Reporter’s Notes, “Section 20 enhances the
efficiency of the arbitral process.”13 The commentary suggests further that the action to clarify
an award in Section 20 is distinguishable from an action to modify or correct the award under
Section 24.14 Few states have adopted the RUAA.15
Its origins in U.S. law notwithstanding, the action to clarify an award has a number of
self-evident unresolved problems of application: For example, when and by whom is the action
triggered?

If because of ambiguity, who defines ambiguity and how much ambiguity is

necessary? Must affected arbitrators agree with the court’s determination of ambiguity? Can
arbitrators ignore or refuse to comply with the court order? Can they reach an independent
determination? When is their correction or clarification of an award sufficient? Are there one,
two, or several awards at the end of an action to clarify? Allowing clarification also raises larger

most instances, for a court to remand cases to arbitrators has caused confusing case law under the FAA regarding
whether and when a court can remand or arbitrators can clarify matters. See III Macneil Treatise §§37.6.4.4;
42.2.4.3; Legion Ins. Co. v. VCW, Inc., 193 F.3d 972 (8th Cir. 1999). The mechanism for correction of errors in
RUAA Section 20 enhances the efficiency of the arbitral process.

13

See id. at comment 4.

14

See id. at comment 1.

15

See Monterey College of Law, Elements of the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, Alternative Dispute Resolution

Newsletter,

2006

(available

online

at

http://www.montereylaw.edu/newsletter/index.jsp?contentid=3N01XJUcpBFrUNjpoIaWDUNc&aop=60). See also
www.ncculs.org.
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systemic concerns. It is undeniable that an invitation to contest the meaning of arbitrator rulings
on the substance invites a judicial practice of merits review and greater and more sustainable
adversarial confrontation among advocates at the enforcement stage of the process. It thereby
lessens arbitration’s finality and effectiveness.
Article 33(1)(b) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration16
preceded the development in U.S. domestic law. It states in its modest language that, “if so
agreed by the parties, a party, with notice to the other party, may request the arbitral tribunal to
give an interpretation of a specific point or part of the award.”17 It then provides that, “[i]f the
arbitral tribunal considers the request to be justified, it shall make the correction or give the
interpretation within thirty days of receipt of the request. The interpretation shall form part of
the award.”18
Article 33(1)(b) has never been considered an important provision of the UNCITRAL
Model Law and it had—until now—escaped the affliction of notoriety.19 Article 35 of the
16

Article 33 was created from Articles 35 to 37 of the UNCITRAL Rules of Arbitration. See First Working Report,

A/CN.9/216, para. 98, at 893 (March 23, 1982). See also H. HOLTZMANN & J. NEUHAUS, A GUIDE TO THE
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, note 1 supra.

17

Article 33(b) of the UNCITRAL Rules of Arbitration.

18

9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4)(2000): “where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a

mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.”

19

See Caron & Reed, Post Award Proceedings Under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 11 ARB. INT’L 429 (1995);

Dermine, L’interprétation des sentences arbitrales, 53 REV. DR. INT’L & DR. COMP. 206 (1976); Garnier,
Interpréter, rectifier et compléter les sentences arbitrales internationals, [1995] REV. ARB. 565; Williams &

10

UNCITRAL Rules of Arbitration serves as its model. It, however, differs from the Rules in that
the interpretation must relate to “a specific point of the award,” it must be made in thirty (not
forty-five) days, and the parties must agree to the interpretation. The arbitral tribunal, however,
can reject “unjustified” requests for interpretation.20 The drafters of the law must have intended
the provision to act as a practical, common sense device by which to address an unusual situation
in which a court or the parties actually did not understand what the arbitrators held in the
award.21

In fact, one international arbitral tribunal has held that “interpretation” means

“clarification.”22
Such a procedure may have been sensible in a circumscribed process founded upon
consensus and trust, but—in contemporary arbitration—enormous sums are in play and
sophisticated advocates do battle. Such an action, therefore, is likely to be shaped by and to
service adversarial adjudication. For its part, FAA §10 has an answer to “incomprehensible”

Buchanan, Correction and Interpretation of Awards Under Article 33 of the Model Law, 4 INT’L ARB. L. REV. 119
(2001).

20

See Summary Record A/CN.9/SR.329, 333 (June 18, 1985). See also H. HOLTZMANN & J. NEUHAUS, note 1

supra.

21

See Commission Report A/40/17 para. 276, at 906 (Aug. 21, 1985).

22

Paul Donin de Rosiere v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, Dec. No. 57-498-1, para. 6 (Feb.

10, 1987).
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arbitrator rulings:

The vacatur of awards that are not “mutual, final, and definite.”23

Unfortunately, the express content of FAA §10 is not mirrored in arbitral treaty law. Also, U.S.
courts have rarely reached determinations to vacate awards on this basis, perhaps considering the
statutory rule too draconian in terms of its impact upon the process.24
None of the U.S. courts that recognizes an action to clarify have ventured a reference to
transborder practice in their decisional rulings.25 By proclaiming a common law right to request
that arbitrators clarify an award, U.S. courts—in all probability—are simply seeking to do better
and more effective justice in regard to arbitration. They perceived a potential problem and
created a workable pragmatic solution to it—at least, in theory. While the action to clarify may
not in the best interests of the arbitral process, it does not necessarily exhibit hostility to
arbitration. An unsympathetic judiciary could invoke almost any legal basis to create barriers to
arbitration.26 The action to clarify an award, in fact, fits well into the contemporary scheme of
judicial supervision. The current law allows courts, on occasion, to assess the merits of arbitral
23

9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4)(2000): “where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a

mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.”

24

See I. MACNEIL, R. SPEIDEL, & T. STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND

REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBIRATION ACT (1994 multi-volume treaties, periodic updates).

25

See text at notes 195-231 infra.

26

The point is demonstrated by the extensive debate that took place prior to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in

Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001): Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 161 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir.
1998), op. amended & superceded on denial reh’g, 177 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1998); Duffield, 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir.
1998); Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994); Adams, 279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2002).

12

awards.27 Under the common law grounds for vacatur, awards can be supervised for manifest
disregard of the law, irrationality, and public policy violations.28 Nonetheless, the FAA and the
court construction of the grounds for supervision under the governing statute remain highly
supportive of arbitration. Neither the party provision for de novo review of arbitrator rulings on
the law or a court order to clarify an award, therefore, expands current practices or challenges the
efficacy of arbitration.
Despite their arguably “seamless” integration into the present framework for
enforcement, the creative additions of practice and the decisional law demand that basic
questions be revisited. Friendly or not, the prospect of enhanced judicial supervision of awards
has consequences. More aggressive or more complicated policing of awards at least causes
delay and increases costs. This makes it difficult for the victors to have their grievances
redressed fully and easier for the transgressors to reduce the compensation owed.
What is the proper role of courts and of the law in the evaluation of arbitral proceedings
and awards? Which regulatory approach best intermediates between the protection of legal
rights and effective adjudication? Should courts become more activist in matters of arbitration
and take liberties with existing legal rules and adapt them to the accomplishment of a particular
end? What ends should be pursued? Should freedom of contract in arbitration always go

27

See, e.g., Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 1994); E. Assoc. Coal Corp. v. United

Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57 (2000).

28

See, e.g., Carbonneau, The Exercise of Contact Freedom in the Making of Arbitration Agreements, supra note 3,

at 298, 308-321.

13

unfettered—even when it may lead to dangerous, possibly counterproductive, practices?
Deregulation has been triumphant in arbitration—is it always in the best interest of the process?
On the transborder side, does enhanced supervision make a positive and long-lasting
contribution to globalization? Does it protect sufficiently the sovereign interests of the national
communities that participate in globalization and transborder arbitration?

In elaborating a

uniform body of arbitral law, does the U.S. judicial endorsement of contract freedom and an
action to clarify awards impose them upon other participants in the transborder process? Have
these two factors created an imbalance between the public legal order and the practical needs of
private adjudication?
Contract freedom emphasizes that party choice makes arbitration a legitimate remedy:
Can the exercise of party choice be allowed to undermine the very utility of the arbitral process?
Private adjudication—if it is to have any standing at all—must be effective. Having courts
police awards on the basis of ambiguity or legal error may not provide any true protection from
ill-considered arbitrator rulings.

The aggressive pursuit of ambiguity or error could allow

adversarial representation to intrude upon, and eventually undermine, the functionality of arbitral
adjudication.
This article addresses the questions raised by examining the grounds for the enforcement
of arbitral awards under U.S. law. Particular attention is devoted to de novo review. Further, the
peculiarities of FAA §10 are examined and reform proposals investigated. These considerations
are evaluated in terms of their impact upon the policy favoring arbitration. The examination then
focuses upon opt-in provisions and the action to clarify.

Finally, the influence of the

developments in U.S. law upon global treaty standards for the enforcement of arbitral awards is

14

assessed. Can parties freely dispose and courts order arbitrators to reach “better” rulings in an
effective global scheme for regulating private adjudication?

The U.S. Law on Enforcement
The U.S. statutory law on arbitration29 greatly favors the enforcement of both domestic and
international arbitral awards.30 As a general matter, the FAA is a modern statement of State

29

The U.S. Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§1-16, 201-208, and 301-307 (1996). Section 10 of the FAA contains four

ground for the vacatur or setting aside of arbitral awards. Under FAA §10, courts can supervise arbitral awards on
the basis that the proceedings lacked basic integrity or were not fundamentally fair: An arbitrator took a bribe or
was biased; and/or a party was not given reasonable notice of the proceeding or an opportunity to be heard. An
award can also be vacated if the arbitrators exceeded their authority. Ordinarily, the latter ground refers narrowly to
circumstances in which the arbitrators ruled on a matter not submitted. See generally I. MACNEIL, R. SPEIDEL, & T.
STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW, note 24 supra. See also Fahnestock & Co., Inc. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d
512, 515 (2d Cir. 1991). It can, however, cover a wider array of arbitrator misconduct. See, e.g., Agrawal v.
Agrawal, 775 F. Supp. 588, 591 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), aff’d, 969 f.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1992). Judicial review on the merits
is excluded by implication—and by corroborating court opinions—because the specific statutory enumeration does
not refer to it. See, e.g., Ainsworth v. Skurnick, 960 F.2d 939, 940 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 915
(1993). The same deferential and narrow review applies to the judicial supervision of international arbitral awards.
See generally 9 U.S.C. §§201-208, 301-307. See also Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, note 2 supra. Moreover, the courts in the United States, especially the federal courts, display a
highly deferential attitude towards arbitral proceedings, rulings and awards. “It is well-settled that a court’s power
to vacate an arbitration award is extremely limited because an overly expansive judicial review of arbitration awards
would undermine the litigation efficiencies which arbitration seeks to achieve.…” Fine v. Bear, Stearns & Col, Inc.,
765 F. Supp. 824, 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). Some courts even acknowledge that judicial supervision is a perfunctory
exercise. “Thus, in reviewing awards, a district or appellate court is limited to determining ‘whether the arbitrators

15

practice on arbitration.31 Like the arbitral treaty law discussed earlier, it impliedly excludes the
judicial review of awards on the merits and, in effect, establishes a strong, nearly irrebuttable
presumption of enforceability in regard to awards.32

Vacatur or nullification can only be

obtained on the basis of specific grounds that focus upon the procedural aspects of the arbitral
proceedings.33 The bribery of arbitrators or other types of corrupt behavior, for instance, will
did the job they were told to do—not whether they did it well, or correctly, or reasonably, but simply whether they
did it.’ ”

30

See, e.g., G. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES ___ (1994); Drahozal,

Standards for Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards in the United States: Mandatory Rules or Default Rules?, 16-9
MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP. 27 (2001); Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of Commercial
Arbitration Awards, 30 GA L. REV. 731 (1996).

31

9 U.S.C. §§1-16, 201-208, and 301-307 (1996). Despite its enactment in the early part of the 20th Century, the

FAA is very favorable to arbitration. It validates arbitration agreements as an expression of a lawful contractual
exercise (§2) and mandates that courts cooperate and assist the arbitral process (§§3, 4). It also recognizes the
jurisdictional effect of arbitration agreements (§3), divesting the courts of the authority to rule on covered disputes.
Finally, it establishes a hospitable regime for the judicial enforcement of arbitral awards (§10).
CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 80-120 [hereinafter CARBONNEAU].

See T.

See also R.

MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION (1992).
32

FAA §10. The presumption and its strength arise from the restrictiveness and specificity of the express statutory

language and the courts’ like-minded and consistent interpretation of the provision and its various parts. Courts
generally interpret the statutory grounds in a narrow fashion and usually enforce awards. See note 1, supra, and
accompany text.

33

Id. It should be noted that the express text of the statute, FAA §10, is supplemented by common law grounds.

These grounds were incorporated into FAA §10 by judicial decisions. They provide for the judicial review of the

16

void an award.34 Moreover, the current arbitral process demands transparency.35 Arbitrators
must be impartial;36 they, therefore, must disclose possible conflicts of interest.37 Their duty of

merits of arbitral awards, whereas the statutory text does not. See Carbonneau, The Exercise of Contact Freedom in
the Making of Arbitration Agreements, supra note 3, at 308-321.

34

See FAA §10; note 28, supra, and accompany text.

35

See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), Uniform Arbitration Act §12—

Disclosures By Arbitrator (2000); Ethics Standards for Neutral Arbitrators in Contractual Arbitration Adopted by
the Judicial Council of California 04/19/2002, DEERING’S CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT, Appendix, Division VI
(Lexis-Nexus 2003); ABA-AAA Code of Ethics for Commercial Arbitrators (2004); INTERNATIONAL BAR
ASSOCIATION (IBA), GUIDELINES FOR ARBITRATOR CONFLICT OF INTEREST (2004). See also Heinsz, The Revised
Uniform Arbitration Act:

Modernizing, Revising and Clarifying Arbitration Law, [2001] J. DISP. RES. 1; T.

CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 130-159 (3d rev. ed. 2003)
[hereinafter T. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS]; Ball, The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act in the United
States: State Law in a Complex Federal System, 5-2 INT’L ARB. L. REV. 56 (2002); Arkin, Neutrality of Dispute
Resolution in International Commercial Dispute Resolution, 15-9 WORLD ARB. & MED. REP. 270 (2004); Ball,
Probity Deconstructed—Hows Helpful, Really, Are the New International Bar Association Guidelines on Conflicts
of Interest in International Arbitration? 15-11 WORLD ARB. & MED. REP. 333 (2004); Disco, The Impression of
Possible Bias: What a Neutral Arbitrator Must Disclose in California, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 113 (1993); Shore,
Disclosure and Impartiality, 57 DISP. RES. J. 32 (2002); Wangelin, Buttressing the Pilars of Arbitration, 19-1
MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP. 27 (2004); Rogers, Fit and Functions in Legal Ethics: Developing a Code of Conduct
for International Arbitration, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 341 (2002); de Witt Wijnen, Voser, & Rao, Background
Information on the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, 5 BUS. L. INT’L 433 (2004);
_________.
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FAA §10(2).
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disclosure is owed to the appointing party, the other arbitrating parties, party representatives, the
other arbitrators, and the administering arbitral institution.38

Further, arbitrators must rule

pursuant to and within the limits of their mandate.39 Deciding matters not submitted or a failure
to abide by the terms of the arbitration agreement can result in a setting aside of the award.40

37

See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145, 89 S.Ct. 337, 21 L.Ed. 2d 301

(1968).

38

See, e.g., Sharp, The Arbitrator’s Duty of Good Faith, 66 ARBITRATION-J. CH. INST. ARB. 228 (2000); Cremades

& Cairns, Corruption, International Public Policy and the Duties of Arbitrators, 58 DISP. RES. J. 56 (2003-2004);
Feerick, The 1977 Code of Ethics for Arbitrators: An Outside Perspective, 18 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 907 (2002);
Carter, Rights and Obligations of the Arbitrator, 52 DISP. RES. J. 56 (1997); Shore, Disclosure and Impartiality, 57
DISP. RES. J. 32 (2002).

39

FAA §10(3).

40

Excess of arbitral authority or an arbitral ruling beyond the arbitrators’ mandate is commonplace in arbitral

statutes. See generally Antoine, Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 54 DISP. RES. J. 23 (1999). The failure to
follow the provisions in the agreement is less commonplace, although doctrinally it is a clear off-shoot of the notion
of freedom of contract. Article V(d) of the New York Arbitration Convention (note 1 supra) contains a version of
the ground for purposes of the enforcement of international arbitral awards: “The composition of the arbitral
authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such
agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place.…” See, e.g.,
Mulyana, Attacking Arbitral Awards Under the New York Convention of 1958, 6 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 89 (1995);
Enkishev, Above the Law: Practical and Philosophical Implications of Contracting for Expanded Judicial Review,
3 J. AM. ARB. 61 (2004).
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Moreover, the arbitral process must satisfy the dictates of basic fairness.41 Parties are entitled to
notice of the demand for arbitration and of the proceedings.42 They also must be provided with a
reasonable opportunity to present their case.43 Procedures that impinge upon or prejudice the
essential procedural rights of an arbitrating party will compromise the integrity of the award and
its enforceability.44
Additionally, U.S. arbitration law, like its English counterpart,45 in complete
contradiction to the express language of FAA §§ 10 and 11, allows for the merits review of

41

FAA §10(3).

42

See, e.g., Liebscher, Fair Trial and Challenge of Awards in Internaitonal Arbitration, 6 CROATIAN ARB. Y.B. 83

(1999); Trappe, The Arbitration Proceedings—Fundamental Principles and Rights of Parties, 15 J. INT’L ARB. 93
(1998).

43

See, e.g., Kessedjian, Principe de la contradiction et l’arbitrage, [1995] REV. ARB. 381. See generally L.

NEWMAN & R. HILL, eds., THE LEADING ARBITRATORS’ GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2003); L.
NEWMAN & G. HANESSIAN, eds., INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CHECKLISTS (2003).

44

FAA §10(3); RUAA §23(3); New York Arbitration Convention, Article V(1)(b).

45

UK Arbitration Act 1996 §45. See Chukwumerije, Judicial Supervision of Commercial Arbitration: The English

Arbitration Act of 1996, 15 ARB. INT’L 171 (1999); Davidson, The New Arbitration Act—A Model Law? J. BUS. L.
101 (1997); Fraser, Arbitration of International Commercial Disputes Under English Law, 9 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1
(1998). See generally B. HARRIS, R. PLANTEROSE, & J. TECKS, THE ARBITRATION ACT 1996: A COMMENTARY
(3d ed. 2003). See note 117, infra, and accompanying text.
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arbitral awards.46 Owing to the ill-conceived judicial incorporation of labor arbitration concepts
and practices into the federal arbitration statute, courts can vacate any domestic arbitral award on
the basis of “manifest disregard of the law,” “irrationality,” and “public policy.”47
International arbitral awards governed by the New York Arbitration Convention and
rendered pursuant to U.S. law or within U.S. territory can also be set aside under Article V(1)(e)
of the Convention on the same common law basis.48 The decisional law implant, therefore, alters
the stated objective of the statute and could redefine the judicial role in terms of enforcement.49
In theory at least, arbitrators no longer are the sovereign decision-makers; courts can review,
revise, or repeal arbitral determinations. Even if it does not enhance the likelihood of vacatur,

46

See, e.g., Carbonneau, The Exercise of Contact Freedom in the Making of Arbitration Agreements, supra note 3,

at 298, 308-321.

47

Id.

48

See Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S.

1111, 118 S.Ct. 1042, 140 L.Ed. 2d 107 (1998) (interpreting Article V(1)(e) of the New York Arbitration
Convention and concluding that, “We need Article V(1)(e) of the Convention to allow a court in the country under
whose law the arbitration was conducted to apply domestic arbitral law, in this case the FAA, to a motion to set
aside or vacate that arbitral award.” An action under Article V(1)(e) “is controlled by the domestic law of the
rendering state.”).

49

See Hayford & Kerrigan, Vacatur: The Non-Statutory Grounds for Judicial Review of Commercial Arbitration

Awards, 51 DISP. RES. J. 22 (1996). See also Carbonneau, The Exercise of Contract Freedom in the Making of
Arbitration Agreements, supra note 3, at 308-321.
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the common law appendage to FAA §1050 makes confirmation and enforcement more
complicated, difficult, precarious, and costly.51
The importation of the labor arbitration doctrines into the FAA52 can be most accurately
described as a judicial blunder. Not all arbitrations or arbitral awards are alike. Meaningful
distinctions can be made between labor and commercial arbitration.53 First, labor arbitration is

50

9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000) the FAA provides for vacatur of an arbitration award in the following narrow instances:

“(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where there was evident partiality or
corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4)where the
arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the
subject matter submitted was not made.” Id.

51

See Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards, note 30 supra;

Lucentini, Taking a Fresh Look at Vacatur of Awards Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 7 AM. REV. INT’L ARB.
359 (1996); Mungioli, The Manifest Disregard of the Law Standard: A Vehicle for Modernization of the Federal
Arbitration Act, 4 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1079 (2000); Poser, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards: Manifest Disregard
of the Law, 64 BROOKLYN L. REV. 471 (1998); Rubins, ‘Manifest Disregard of Law’ and Vacatur of Arbitral
Awards in the United States, 12 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 363 (2001). See also Carbonneau, The Exercise of Contract
Freedom in the Making of Arbitration Agreements, supra note 3, at 308-321.

52

See Carbonneau, The Exercise of Contract Freedom in the Making of Arbitration Agreements, supra note 3, at

308-321.

53

See generally id.
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not governed by the FAA, but rather Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of
1947.54

Because of the particularities of the system established by collective bargaining

agreements (CBAs), judicial supervision of the merits of labor arbitration awards is necessary.55
Labor arbitrators cannot engage in dispensing “their own brand of industrial justice.”56 While
they are expected to interpret the CBA in reference to the practices of the affected workplace and
their experience,57 labor arbitrators cannot lawfully “manifestly” “disregard” the “law” as it is
established by the CBA. The CBA is the Constitution or Civil Code of a given workplace.
Arbitrators are expected to apply its content to specific cases, not engage in a unilateral
reformation or modification of its provisions.58 In their awards, arbitrators must stay within the
four corners of the CBA.59 The decisional phrase that provides that an award must arise from or
54

See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957);

United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960).

55

See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424

(1960).

56

United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987); E.

Assoc. Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., District 17, 531 U.S. 57, 121 S.Ct. 462, 148 L.Ed.2d 354
(2000). See generally 2 P. HARDIN, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW ch. 29, 1698-1706 (3d ed. 1992); P. SLOVAK, M.
POSNER, & J. HIGGINS, JR., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1995 CUM. SUPP. ch. 29, 479-486 (3d ed.1995).

57

Id.

58

Id.

59

Id.
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stay within the scope of the contract is an unmistakable allusion to the authority of the CBA and
its function in the workplace. It makes no sense in terms of ordinary contractual circumstances.
The second major difference is the prohibition against “irrational,” “arbitrary,” and
“capricious” arbitral determinations must have been intended as a failsafe means of safeguarding
labor parties from unprofessional arbitrators who became personally involved with the parties
and the issues in the arbitration.60 Given that the labor arbitration system applies literally to
thousands of individual workplace settings,61 at least a few arbitrators might abandon their
necessary distance from the proceedings and base their awards on their personal feelings and
beliefs. The volatile character of union-management relations makes episodic unprofessional
adjudicatory rulings likely.

It is also possible that arbitrators might suffer a physical and

emotional incapacity during the proceedings and render rulings in an impaired state. In a word,
corrective devices needed to be in place to prevent the adjudicatory sovereignty of the arbitrator
from becoming a totalitarian dictatorship. Workplace disputes needed to be resolved pursuant to
the rule of law and by means of an “objective” process.
There is no hard evidence that the ban in labor arbitration against irrational awards was a
means of protecting grievants against rageful and volatile arbitrators. The suggestion is purely
speculative.

It, however, might constitute an ingenious way of establishing a meaningful

distinction between irrational arbitral decisions and manifest disregard of the law. The FAA case

60

See T. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 35, at 610-612.

61

See note 58, supra, and accompany text.
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law, however, has been more circumspect on this score.62

It contains no mention of

“adjudicatory rage” or “arbitrator breakdowns.” In fact, it strains to find a persuasive difference
between the two bases for challenging the determinations reached by labor arbitrators.63 In court
opinions, both grounds appear to be grounded in the arbitrator’s would-be disregard of or failure
to apply the provisions of the CBA. Each serves to prevent arbitrators from dispensing their own
“brand of industrial justice.”
Manifest disregard of the law specifically looks at whether there was “willful
inattentiveness to the governing law.”64 A finding of manifest disregard requires more than mere
error or misunderstanding of the law.65

The decisional law seems to say that a manifest

disregard of the law stems from an irrational determination and that an irrational ruling by an
arbitrator is based upon and results in the manifest disregard of the law.66 The grounds overlap
so substantially that they are duplicative and redundant.
How the overlap came about is difficult to ascertain. There appears to be no self-evident
reason of labor relations that might explain the need for and development of these two separate
grounds for the vacatur of labor awards. They seem to constitute a surplusage of protection.
62

See T. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 35, at 599.

63

See id. at 611-612.

64

ARW Exploration Corp., 45 F.3d at 1463

65

Id.

66

Id.
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Nonetheless, it is equally undeniable that the courts have embedded both grounds in the identical
rationale of a respect for law, specifically the CBA. Additionally, neither ground serves much of
a true policing function; they are equally difficult to establish and rarely have any real impact
upon the enforceability of arbitral awards.

Courts very infrequently find that arbitrators

manifestly disregarded the applicable law or engaged in rendering irrational determinations.67
The reason for the infrequency in non-labor circumstances is that there is no CBA to disregard.
There, these grounds for vacatur are not only misplaced, but misfits.
Such rules do, however, have a practical impact upon FAA arbitration. They provide
disgruntled parties with a means of procedural obfuscation. Parties liable under an award have
additional means for challenging the determination. They can delay and possibly discount their
liability by invoking these further means of recourse. Concomitantly, the winners seek judicial
enforcement at a higher cost. Moreover, the common law grounds mandate that courts engage in
an appraisal of the arbitrator’s substantive ruling. Disregard of the law and irrationality of
determination can only be evaluated by examining the arbitrator’s ruling on the merits.68 The
imported common law grounds give the courts a licence—that otherwise is precluded—to
scrutinize the arbitrator’s substantive determination despite the lack of a CBA or its equivalent in
FAA arbitrations.

67

See Carbonneau, The Exercise of Contract Freedom in the Making of Arbitration Agreements, supra note 3, at

314-321. See also Ainsworth v. Skurnick, 960 F.2d 939 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 915 (1993);
O’Mullan, Seeking Consistency in Judicial Review of Securities Arbitration: An Analysis of the Manifast Disregard
of the Law Standard, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1121 (1995).

68

Id.
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All that has been said about the first two common law grounds also applies to the third—
the public policy exception to enforcement.69 The Misco rule,70 as reaffirmed by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Eastern Coal,71 is that arbitral awards can be set aside when the arbitrator’s
ruling violates an “explicit, dominant, and well-defined” public policy.72 The Court, along with
lower federal courts,73 have been abundantly clear that the rule is not intended to create a broadgauged, fluid, and circumstantially variable public policy exception to the enforcement of arbitral
awards. The Misco rule also arose in the circumstances of labor arbitration and is intended to
function in that setting. As with the other two common law grounds, it is meant to contain the
substantive discretion of labor arbitrators and to force a basic compliance on their part with the
rule of law, i.e., the law of the contract (the CBA) and the workplace. The Misco rule, in effect,
allows courts to nullify awards in which arbitrators ignore federal legislation on labor law
matters. Arbitrators must observe and respect such statutory law when it is relevant to the case.

69

See T. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 35, at 599.

70

United Paper Workers’ Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987).
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See Eastern Association Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., District 17, note 56 supra. See also 531 US

57 (2000).

72

Misco, 484 U.S. at 47; Eastern Assoc. Coal Corp., 531 U.S. at 63.

73

See, e.g., Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 994 F.2d 775, 782 (11th Cir. 1993).
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The public policy exception is not even contemplated in FAA § 10, but is part of Article
V of the New York Arbitration Convention and is, therefore, part of FAA Chapter Two.74 The
case law interpreting the New York Arbitration Convention makes clear that neither public nor
foreign policy considerations are likely to hinder the enforceability of international arbitral
awards.75

Domestic U.S. considerations might become germane through the setting aside

procedure when the United States serves as the venue of the arbitration.76 Once again, the
contrast between Misco and the express text of the FAA §10 is striking. It reinforces the view
that the integration of the common law grounds is untoward and an exercise that is ultimately
counterproductive.
Labor arbitrators, therefore, cannot ignore, denature, or reform the governing law.77
Society delegates the responsibility and the authority to “maintain industrial peace”78 to labor
arbitrators as long as they respect essential legal commands. The public cannot be excluded
entirely from the process of CBA arbitration. As noted earlier, arbitrators may be monarchs, but
they are not also lawgivers. They supply the link between the CBA and standard practices in the
74

Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, note 2 supra.

75

See Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc. v. Société Générale de L’Industiné du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d

969 (2d Cir. 1974); National Oil Corp. v. Libyan Sun Oil Co., 733 F.Supp. 800 (D.Del. 1990).

76

See Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., note 48 supra.

77

See, e.g., Eastern Association Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., District 17, note 56 supra.

78

See, e.g., Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., note 54 supra.
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workplace and the continuing emergence of workplace disputes.79 Labor relations demand that
the legal regulation of arbitration permit a limited judicial supervision of the merits of labor
awards. Such a requirement is not necessary in FAA arbitration. Non-labor forms of arbitration
are generally not governed by statutes or involve essential legislative protections. The FAA
makes no provision whatsoever for having courts scrutinize arbitrator determinations for
compliance with substantive legal norms. The evolution of FAA arbitration to include statutory
and regulatory disputes in the areas of consumer and employment (as well as commercial)
disputes may argue for aligning FAA and CBA arbitration on the matter of merits review. The
enhanced scope of FAA arbitration, therefore, could entail a substantial alteration of its
traditional protocol.

The Impartiality of Arbitrators

The most effective basis in U.S. law upon which to challenge an arbitral award is the
ground of “evident partiality” under FAA §10(2).

Two factors converged to create this

circumstance. First, the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Commonwealth Coatings80 in 1968,
and, second, the arbitration bar’s current preoccupation with arbitrator disclosures81—which is

79

See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., note 54 supra.

80

See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145, 89 S.Ct. 337, 21 L.Ed. 2d 301

(1968)

81

See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL

ARBITRATION, note 44 supra; ABA-AAA, Code of Ethics for Commercial Arbitrators, note 44 supra. See generally
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shared by a number of other institutions.82 In Commonwealth Coatings, the Court emphasized
the central significance of the selection of arbitrators. Once appointed, arbitrators have little, if
any, constraints upon the exercise of their authority. Judicial rectification of arbitrator actions or
dispositions is rarely available. Appeal is very limited and, when brought, is almost never
successful.83

In its decision, the Court emphasized that, in light of the arbitrator’s nearly

unlimited authority as to matters of procedure and substance, the information that serves as the
basis of appointment becomes exceedingly important. Arbitrating parties needed to have full and
accurate information about prospective arbitrators because, once designated, their authority to
rule is nearly unchecked (unless the parties’ agreement provides otherwise).84 The lack of
arbitrator accountability is further enhanced by their immunity from suit.85 Disclosures, the
Court seemed to say, are instrumental to fundamental consumer protection in arbitration.

Figueroa, Ethics in Internaitonal Arbitration, 18— MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP. 41 (2003); Rogers, Fit and
Functions in Legal Ethics: Developing a Code of Conduct for International Arbitration, note 44 supra; de Witt
Wijnen, Voser, & Rao, Background Information on the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International
Arbitration, note 35 supra.

82

See, e.g., An Update on California Arbitrator Ethical Standards, 16-4 WORLD ARB. & MED. REP. 107 (2005).

83

Commonwealth Coatings Corp., 393 U.S. at 62 – 63. .
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Id. at 68 – 69.
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See J. LEW, ed., THE IMMUNITY OF ARBITRATORS (1990); Bristow, The Gathering Storm of Arbitrators’ and

Mediators’ Liability, [2000] ARB. & DISP. RES. L.J. 233.
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In recent years, a number of organizations have displayed a strong interest in establishing
“tribunal-wide” arbitrator neutrality.

The organizations include the American Arbitration

Association (AAA), the American Bar Association (ABA), the International Bar Association
(IBA), and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).86 The Judicial Council of California
and the California state legislature have also been active on this matter.87 The AAA-ABA Code
of Ethic for Arbitrators, for example, establishes a presumption that all arbitrators, including
party-designated arbitrators, are neutral.88

Prior practice embraced the opposite approach,

namely, that party-designated arbitrators were expected to favor the designating party’s position.
The third arbitrator, appointed by the two party-appointed arbitrators to be the presiding chair,
was the truly neutral arbitrator.89 Thereafter, the IBA released its Guidelines on arbitrator
disclosure and conflicts of interest.90

The Guidelines attempt to provide a sense of what

86

See note 35, supra, and accompanying text.

87

See note 82, supra, and accompanying text.

88

Id.
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See Carter, Improving Life with the Party-Appointed Arbitrator: Clearer Conduct Guidelines for ‘Nonneutral’s,

11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 295 (2000); Eisemann, The Partisan Arbitrator, 4-2 INDIAN COUNCIL ARB. Q. 3 (1969);
Rau, On Integrity in Private Judging, 14 ARB. INT’L 115 (1998); Yu Hong-lin & Shore, Independence, Impartiality,
and Immunity of Arbitrators, 52 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 935 (2003).

90

See note 35, supra, and accompanying text.
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information arbitrators must, should, and should not disclose.91 They seek to establish workable
and realistic provisions on arbitrator disclosure that address the large law firm factor in
international commercial arbitration and other professional considerations.92
Judicial practice has yet to endorse the new development. The case law continues to
distinguish between neutral and party-appointed arbitrators and to apply different professional
standards to each of them.93 Under this approach, absolute impartiality applies only to the
neutral arbitrator.94 The California Judicial Council, however, has taken the lead in spearheading
the arbitrator disclosure reform at the state level within the United States.95 The disclosure
standards that were eventually enacted in California were so onerous and exacting that securities
arbitration organizations refused to conduct arbitrations in which arbitrators were subject to these
standards.96 Both the NASD and the NYSE believed that the elaborate disclosure requirements

91

Ball, Probity Deconstructed, note 35 supra.

92

Id.

93

See Austin South 1, Ltd. v. Barton-Malow Co., 799 F. Supp. 1135, 1142 (M.D. Fla. 1992); Hayne, Miller & Farni,

Inc. v. Flume, 888 F. Supp. 949, 953-954 (E.D. Wis. 1995); Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1045, 1047-1048 (9th
Cir. 1994); Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. TUCO, Inc., 960 S.W. 2d 629 (Tex. 1997).
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See, e.g., Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 1994).
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See note 82, supra, and accompanying text.
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See NASDR v. Judicial Council of Ca., 232 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
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might undermine the enforceability of awards under FAA §10(2).97 A stand-off ensured between
the various parties that was crowned by litigation and a concomitant SEC ruling exempting
securities arbitrations in California from the state disclosure rules pending the outcome of the
lawsuit.98
The most curious aspect of the discussion about and activity surrounding the matter of
arbitrator neutrality is that it has not been triggered as a result of actual abuse. The focus is upon
the potential for abuse. The institutions that have led the charge, as it were, are more concerned
with protecting and preserving the legitimacy and reputation of arbitration. They see the use of
partisan arbitrators as providing a basis for the external criticism and undermining of the process.
There also may be a practical concern that questions regarding arbitrator impartiality could
thwart the enforcement of awards. The California state rules on arbitrator disclosure, however,
were born of a different set of concerns:
antagonism toward arbitration.

They reflect California’s skepticism and even

From the California perspective, mandatory arbitration,

especially in consumer and employment matters, deprives weaker parties of their legal rights and
symbolizes the oppression of these parties by unprincipled and unbridled corporate interests. In
fact, both federal and state courts in California99 stand alone in elaborating increasingly

97

See, e.g., NASD Proposes Amendments to the Code of Arbitration Procedures, 14-11 WORLD ARB. & MED. REP.

304 (2003).
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See notes ___ & ___, supra, and accompanying text.
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restrictive case law rules on the validity of arbitration agreements.

As to legislation and

regulations, California is unique among states in the number of proposed laws and regulations
that seek to limit the recourse to arbitration.100 Such a policy, however, may only deprive
California residents of a functional adjudicatory process.
Establishing true parity between parties maybe an elusive and misconceived goal.
Making rules for arbitrator disclosure will increase litigious practices in arbitration that seek to
disqualify arbitrators adversarially at the head of the process or to vacate awards at the end of the
process. Consumer and employee protection will not be enhanced nor will legal rights be more
secure. Although the political opposition is strident, it is not based upon a realistic assessment of
the operation of the legal system. It reflects a foregone ideological conviction that only public
institutions can be trusted to protect the interests of individual citizens and that the marketplace
can never achieve truly salutary ends because of a power imbalance. The ideological conviction
necessarily distorts both the facts and the issues.

Vacatur as an Abridgment of Arbitral Confidentiality

100

See, e.g., Calif. Assembly Again Seeks Limits on Employment Arbitrative, ADRWorld.com, March 7, 2006. A
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at

A point about the enforcement of arbitral awards under the FAA that has never been
made with sufficient conviction is that vacatur proceedings breach the presumed confidentiality
of the arbitral process. No matter what ground serves as the basis of the action, vacatur generally
entails the development of a full judicial record regarding the underlying arbitration. Any of the
statutory or common law grounds for vacatur can justify an extensive adversarial confrontation
about whether the necessary elements are constituted under the evidence. Moreover, the parties
can engage in a definitional contest about the exact significance of the ground and can further
debate the impact of that result upon the specific circumstances of the case. In effect, many
vacatur proceedings result in a complete re-enactment of the arbitral proceedings on a public
record before a court.

Once the court ruling is made available, the arbitration has been

completely exposed. An attempt to vacate the award will, therefore, result in destroying the
confidentiality of arbitral proceedings.
Disgruntled parties who refuse to comply voluntarily with an award can also use the
vacatur procedure to delay the day of reckoning or discount their liability. They can expose the
existence and content of the arbitral proceedings and thereby eliminate—post facto—a major
business benefit of arbitration. Parties might argue that they have a due process right to some
form of de minimus appeal against awards, that they should be protected against the possible
corruption and fundamental unfairness of the process, as well as flagrant arbitrator abuse.
Appeal, however, ceases to be de minimus once it thwarts a vital benefit and the essential
attractiveness of the arbitral process. While absolute confidentiality of the arbitral proceedings
cannot be guaranteed, enforcement actions should not allow the losing party to exact the
proverbial “pound of flesh” or to inflict damage on the winner by rehashing the entirety of the
proceedings. Participants in the arbitral process must recognize that their abuse of right can
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deprive society of a workable and fair adjudicatory process. Accordingly, should FAA §10
vacatur actions be altered and, if so, how and by whom?101
The Eleventh Circuit has recently taken that position that parties should be held
accountable for “specious” appeals against arbitral awards.

In B.L. Harbert Int’l, LLC v.

Hercules Steel Co., the court entertained a challenge to confirmation based upon manifest
disregard of the law. The litigation involved a dispute about the meaning of the contract between
commercial parties. The arbitrator ruled in favor of one party and the other party instantly
brought an action requesting the arbitrator to clarify the award. Thereafter, an action to vacate
was filed before the district court and then appeal to the Eleventh Circuit. From the outset, the
court perceived the systemic implications of the case:
The laudatory goals of the FAA will be achieved only to the extent that
courts ensure arbitration is an alternative to litigation, not an additional layer in
a protracted contest. If we permit parties who lose in arbitration to freely
relitigate their cases in court, arbitration will do nothing to reduce congestion
in the judicial system; dispute resolution will be slower instead of faster; and
101
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reaching a final decision will cost more instead of less. This case is a good
example of the poor loser problem and it provides us with an opportunity to
discuss a potential solution.

The court’s assessment of the circumstances of the appeal speaks eloquently for itself:

There is no evidence that the attorney for Hercules urged the arbitrator
to disregard the law, and Harbert does not even suggest that happened. There
is no evidence that the arbitrator decided the dispute on the basis of anything
other than his best judgment—whether right or wrong—of how the law applies
to the facts of the case. There is, in short, no evidence that the arbitrator
manifestly disregarded the law. The only manifest disregard of the law evident
in this case is Harbert’s refusal to accept the law of this circuit which narrowly
circumscribes judicial review of arbitration awards. By attacking the
arbitration award in this case Harbert has shown at best an indifference to the
law of our circuit governing the subject. Harbert’s refusal to accept that there
is no basis in the law for attacking the award has come at a cost to the party
with whom Harbert entered into the arbitration agreement and to the judicial
system.
In litigating this case without good basis through the district court and
now through this Court, Harbert has deprived Hercules and the judicial system
itself of the principal benefits of arbitration. Instead of costing less, the
resolution of this dispute has cost more than it would have had there been no
arbitration agreement. Instead of being decided sooner, it has taken longer
than it would have to decide the matter without arbitration. Instead of being
resolved outside the courts, this dispute has required the time and effort of the
district court and this Court.
When a party who loses an arbitration award assumes a never-say-die
attitude and drags the dispute through the court system without an objectively
reasonable belief it will prevail, the promise of arbitration is broken.
Arbitration’s allure is dependent upon the arbitrator being the last decision
maker in all but the most unusual cases. The more cases there are, like this
one, in which the arbitrator is only the first stop along the way, the less
arbitration there will be. If arbitration is to be a meaningful alternative to
litigation, the parties must be able to trust that the arbitrator’s decision will be
honored sooner instead of later.
Courts cannot prevent parties from trying to convert arbitration losses
into court victories, but it may be that we can and should insist that if a party
on the short end of an arbitration award attacks that award in court without any
real legal basis for doing so, that party should pay sanctions. A realistic threat
of sanctions may discourage baseless litigation over arbitration awards and
help fulfill the purpose of the pro-arbitration policy contained in the FAA. It is
an idea worth considering.
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[…]

The Eleventh Circuit ruling echoes the practical concerns expressed by Justice Breyer in
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan that the litigation relating to arbitration should be held
to a minimum in order to preserve the benefits of arbitral adjudication. In an adversarial system,
it is unlikely that the parties and their counsel will engage in self-discipline. It is, therefore, the
courts’ responsibility to discourage post-award litigious representational conduct and to limit the
appeal procedure to absolutely fundamental abuse. The law—namely FAA §10—could assist in
maintaining the posture of arbitral appeal by recognizing and enforcing a procedure of internal
arbitral appeal.

In arbitrations between merchant parties, cases that do not involve any

significant disparity between party positions, due process concerns must cede to the effectiveness
and functionality of the adjudicatory process. The parties must respect the finality of arbitrator
determinations that resulted from an essentially fair proceeding. It is simply too easy for talented
advocates to foist a laundry list of objections before the courts on behalf of their losing clients.
The Eleventh Circuit decision is in keeping with the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Buckeye, where the Court affirmed the decisional and procedural sovereignty of the arbitrator. It
also points to the need to modernized the provisions of the FAA.
To curb the misuse of vacatur under the FAA, courts might require a threshold
evidentiary showing by the party opposing enforcement in an in camera proceeding. The latter
would be an adversarial action intended to show whether the opposing party has any real
prospect of succeeding in its challenge. If the court determines in the summary proceeding that
there is a lack of probable success by the party opposing enforcement, it would simply confirm
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the award.

Such preliminary proceedings would not result in a published opinion.

The

governing standard could be stated as imposing a burden of rebutting a strong presumption of
enforceability on the party opposing the award. Restricting the accessibility of appeal even more
than the statute does already will reinvigorate the critics who claim that arbitration amounts to a
substantial deprivation of legal rights and abridgement of constitutional guarantees.102
Another, albeit partial, solution would be to eliminate the common law grounds as a basis
for recourse against arbitral awards under the FAA. The solution appears warranted given what
was said previously about the origins of the grounds and their integration into FAA §10. The
“head wind” of tradition, however, might become a substantial obstacle to change. Courts have a
long history with the common law grounds.

They have generated an elaborate case law,

absorbed a great deal of judicial energy, and have a long-standing and serious presence in the
U.S. law of arbitration. In the vast majority of cases, they provide the judiciary with an anodyne
possibility of asserting its role in the law of arbitration through a traditional court function.
Although it would rid the law of merits supervision and provide necessary autonomy to
arbitration, extricating the common law grounds from FAA §10 would undo a large part of the
judicial culture that currently surrounds arbitration.
A more radical solution may be to discontinue vacatur actions altogether and to provide
for the automatic enforcement of arbitral awards.103 Such a procedure exists in ICSID or World
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Bank Arbitration104 and in the Dutch law of arbitration.105 It is a practice that is in effect in
jurisdictions that highly favor arbitration, like the United States. Courts would automatically
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confirm and coercively enforce arbitral awards without any but formalistic supervision (i.e., does
an award exist and is it ascertainable in recognized documentary form) as long as appeal to a
second arbitral tribunal was available following the rendition of the award. Administrating
arbitral institutions or contract provisions could establish an internal appellate procedure. Access
to the second tribunal could be made available on grounds similar or identical to those contained
in FAA §10 or another statutory or treaty framework (e.g., the UNCITRAL Model law106 or the
1996 UK Arbitration Act).107 The arbitral process would yield a single award. A time-limit or
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other restrictions might be imposed. Such a procedure would protect the confidentiality of the
arbitral process and reinforce its self-sufficiency and independence from courts.

Expanding Constricted “Manifest Disregard”

“Manifest disregard” has a rich history and an important placein the U.S. regulation of
arbitration.108 It is frequently invoked by parties and rejected by courts with almost equal
frequency.109
108
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doctrine,111 although many courts continue to debate its significance.112 The number and length
of the discussions have not given the notion any greater practical impact upon arbitral awards.
Like many of the FAA grounds, it simply invites losing parties to bring perfunctory challenges
against awards.113
instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator. Moreover, the term ‘disregard’ implies
that the arbitrator appreciated the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore or pay no
attention to it.…To adopt a less strict standard of judicial review would be to undermine our well established
deference to arbitration as a favored method of settling disputes when agreed to by the parties.…Judicial inquiry…is
therefore extremely limited.”
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Several years ago, the Second Circuit provided a novel dissertation upon manifest
disregard. In Halligan v. Piper Jafffray, Inc.,114 the court held that an arbitral award could be
vacated because the arbitrators presumptively disregarded the law, the evidence, or both
elements of the case.115 The litigation involved claims of age-based discrimination brought by a
senior broker who had been forced to resign from Piper Jaffray, Inc. Allegations and counterallegations were made. The broker died during the proceedings after having undergone several
surgeries for oral cancer.116 The arbitral tribunal eventually rejected Halligan’s claims, but did
not submit any reasons to explain its conclusions. The district court rejected the claim that the
tribunal “manifestly disregarded the law” in reaching its determination.117 It held that the
tribunal’s determination could be supported by the facts and applicable law. Moreover, the
tribunal had sovereign discretion in the evaluation of evidence. Finally, the judicial role was not
to second-guess the arbitrators’ dispositions.118
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The appellate court expressed skepticism about the wisdom of using arbitration in
employment matters that involved civil rights issues. It stated that the arbitration of Title VII
claims might require greater judicial supervision of arbitral determinations in order to guarantee
the integrity of legal rights.119 Moreover, a tribunal’s failure to render an explanatory reasoning
with its award made the determination suspect (“the absence of explanation may reinforce the
reviewing court’s confidence that the arbitrators engaged in manifest disregard.”).120 The court
concluded that the arbitrators had been presented with convincing evidence of age-based
discrimination and had been fully and accurately briefed by the parties on the applicable law.
The court, therefore, held that the arbitrators “ignored the law or the evidence or both.”121 The
opinion illustrate well the gravamen for the prohibition against the judicial review of the merits
of arbitral awards. Inviting courts to disagree with the arbitral tribunal’s determination could
well result in judicial disagreement and vacatur.122
In Wallace v. Buttar,123 the Second Circuit reversed its determination in Halligan,
holding that arbitral awards could not be vacated on the basis that the arbitrators had engaged in
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the “manifest disregard of the evidence.”124

Moreover, the court emphasized the highly

exceptional character of manifest disregard of the law, deeming it to be a “doctrine of last
resort”125 that could be found to exist only when “(1) the arbitrators knew of a governing legal
principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether, and (2) [confusing its description with
the Misco rule on public policy126] the law ignored by the arbitrators was well defined, explicit,
and clearly applicable to the case.”127
Citing the Second Circuit decision in Halligan, the district court had vacated the award
because the securities arbitral tribunal had “manifestly disregarded the facts” and the “law” by
imposing the liability of a “control person” and the theory of respondeat superior upon the group
of defendants when these concepts clearly did not apply.128 In the district court’s view, Halligan
permitted vacatur when “an arbitral award . . . runs contrary to ‘strong’ evidence favoring the
party bringing the motion to vacate.”129 The rulings was faithful to the doctrine established by
the Second Circuit in Halligan.
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Nonetheless, the Second Circuit reversed the district court and, in doing so, in effect
repudiated its decision in Halligan. The appellate court criticized the lower court for taking “too
broad a view” of the FAA grounds for vacatur.130 In particular, it held that “manifest disregard
of the facts or evidence” was not “an independent ground for vacatur,” asserting that the contrary
ruling in Halligan was mere “dicta” and somehow never part of the law in the circuit.131 The
Second Circuit embraced a more characteristically deferential judicial posture, stating that a
court could examine the record of an arbitration only to determine whether it provided “a
colorable basis” for the arbitral tribunal’s ruling.132 In such a setting, a finding of manifest
disregard of the law was “exceedingly rare” and involved an “egregious impropriety” by the
arbitrators in the application of the governing law.133 Moreover, manifest disregard of the law
could not be invoked unless the statutory grounds in FAA §10 did not provide relief and manifest
disregard was the sole means of rectifying a serious problem or deficiency in the award.134 If the
arbitrators followed the uncontroverted statement of law presented in the proceedings, manifest
disregard was inapplicable even when the error in law or legal reasoning was self-evident.135
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Judicial standards do not control arbitrator application of law; rather, how the average arbitrator
would have construed the law is the governing rule.136 Many arbitrators are technical specialists
with no legal training.
Wallace v. Buttar137 demonstrates the time-honored role of courts in U.S. arbitration law.
Court deference has made for a successful cohabitation between arbitrator sovereignty and
judicial authority. The courts’ mission in terms of arbitration is to correct only profound abuses
or flaws in the process. A more activist stance, illustrated by the creation from whole cloth of
the action to clarify awards,138 is likely to render arbitral adjudication less functional and may
eventually throw it into a dysfunctional state. Increasing rights protection in arbitration for no
other reason than its possibility, that it arguably makes sense, and it reflects what is done in court
is a very bad idea indeed. It may be true that arbitrators get the vast majority of interesting civil
cases and have a more appealing docket; that circumstance, however, cannot justify tinkering
with the arbitral process and modifying the core principles of arbitration law. The resourceful
use of the judicial imagination can sometimes result in a disease of epidemic proportions. The
rights protection rationale is likely to be translated into adversarial advantage and significantly
compromise the operation of the arbitral process.
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The incorporation of the common law grounds for vacatur was an even worse idea.139 It
has done very little for arbitration law except to create greater complexity and confusion in
matters of enforcement. The rights of the parties are not enhanced; arbitration is not even
perceived as more legitimate or fairer. Courts simply got to say very judicial things about the
possible vacatur of arbitral awards. They also enhanced the procedural position of recalcitrant
and culpable parties. Vacatur allows for loser privilege and abuse, delay, and discounts of
liability. Even a modest form of judicial supervision violates the confidentiality of the arbitral
process.

Possible Change

Those who argue for the recrafting the FAA140 are undeniably correct in their view. The
statute has had a distinguished history and is still a sensible contemporary statement of how to
regulate arbitration. It is, however, badly in need of updating and needs to be written as an
arbitration statute, not a procedural guide to the integration of arbitral procedure into the U.S.
legal process. FAA §§10 and 11 are excellent illustrations of the need for reform. Vacatur, as it
has evolved and been practiced, should probably be abolished. While judicial supervision must
be maintained to act as a check on arbitrator power and to correct periodic abuses, it must be
139
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confined to the exceptional case and cannot be made available as the standard procedure in all
cases. Some significant threshold showing must be made by the party opposing confirmation
before judicial supervision even for procedural matters can be invoked. This strong presumption
in favor of enforcement, as it does now, would support avoiding all judicial supervision and
essentially result in the automatic judicial confirmation of awards. The statute could encourage
parties to provide for the arbitral appeal of awards on whatever grounds and through whatever
private procedural process. It should also make clear that subsequent judicial confirmation of the
final award is extremely likely.
The grounds for judicial supervision, assuming a rebuttal of the strong presumption of
confirmation, would address circumstances in which the award results from a corrupt arbitration.
An arbitration becomes corrupted or denatured as an adjudicatory proceeding when it amounts to
a denial of justice to one of the parties. Such prejudice can be achieved in circumstances,
attitudes, or beliefs that deny a party the opportunity to be heard, to make its case, and to respond
to the other party’s allegation. Whenever an arbitration becomes an empty formalism and its
results a foregone conclusion, the decision that proceeds from it cannot be given compulsory
executory legal force. Debilitating elements would include bribery, arbitrator interest in the
outcome, preconceived and fixed dispositions in arbitrators, and unrevealed prior, direct, and
involved relationships with other people in the arbitration. The Hooter’s arbitration process
described in Hooter’s of Am., Inc. v. Phillips141 constitutes a good demonstration of a corrupt or
denatured arbitration framework.142

Beyond these things flagrant, arbitrations would be
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presumptively valid and have that status in fact. This approach should be good for both domestic
and international arbitral awards, although the content of Article V of the New York Arbitration
Convention would control. But for the occasional guffaw, this system already applies in effect.
Perhaps equally controversial, some thought must be given to incorporating a strain of
merits review into any new framework for the confirmation of arbitral awards under the FAA.
The relatively recent but now well-settled expansion of the scope of arbitration to include
statutory disputes could give new life and function to “manifest disregard of the law.”143
Incorporating such a basis for review into the framework for enforcing international arbitral
awards would be unrealistic: It would conflict with Article V of the New York Arbitration
Convention and would be generally disruptive of international commercial arbitration.144 The
expansion of domestic arbitration into consumer and employment matters and the application of
the 1964 and 1991 Civil Rights Act, consumer protection legislation, ERISA, and other social
policy statutes, may require that courts supervise with some real rigor arbitrator rulings on
statutory matters.
The foregoing proposal can be criticized on a number of grounds. Merits review of any
kind and on whatever basis undermines the authority of the arbitrator and the autonomy of the
arbitral process. Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has been absolutely clear and unyielding on
the point that arbitration is just as good as judicial litigation (it is simply different) and, therefore,
it does not result in a compromising or abridgement of legal rights. As a procedural mechanism,
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arbitration has no impact upon the content of substantive rights! Arbitrators can decide issues of
statutory law just like contract matters. There is no need to second-guess the arbitrator on either
score, says the Court.
Given adversarial dispositions, there is every likelihood that a statutory inroad into the
merits review of awards will fester into a plague. The implicated rights arise from public law
provisions that generally harbor a good deal of disagreement on political and moral grounds.
The ideological volatility of the statutory law is, therefore, likely to lead to the nullification of
awards, their revision, or their partial (as opposed to full) enforcement. Such a consequence
would make both consumer and employment (and perhaps other forms) of arbitration ineffective
adjudicatory processes.
The right to supervise arbitrator statutory rulings on the merits could be introduced but
contained by court discretion. In keeping with the provisions of the 1996 UK Arbitration Act,
courts could have the authority to refuse to exercise their review powers if they deemed it
inappropriate or unwarranted in the circumstances. Having a discretionary prerogative to rule,
however, could result in making the action so exceptional as to render it perfunctory or could
entail so many variations among the different judicial jurisdictions that a uniform rule or set of
rules would be precluded.
The two major policy issues of arbitration law are at the core of this discussion.
Privileging the protection of legal rights will always diminish the functionality of the arbitral
process. Moreover, heightening the presence and role of courts in arbitration will always bring
the arbitral process closer to the morass of traditional judicial litigation. The choice of pathways
is stark and the dangers of the choice are irreducible. Finally, whichever approach is chosen,
there must be a sufficient political will to implement it.
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Freedom of Contract Innovation: Opt-In Provisions

Prior to the emergence of opt-in provisions, critics portrayed arbitration as undermining
the sovereignty of the State and the regulatory authority of public law. In their view, private
adjudication and the exercise of contract freedom diminished the State’s legislative and
adjudicatory hegemony. Opt-in provisions have eliminated the very foundation of that criticism.
In these provisions, the rule of contract freedom no longer shields arbitral adjudication from
public law requirements, but rather seeks to incorporate into arbitration standard appellate
procedures that are protective of legal rights. The fundamental dynamics of the process have
been altered—reversed, in fact. Judicial interference is no longer feared, but desired. The true
sovereigns in the process—the parties—can command courts to scrutinize arbitrator
determinations if they deem such protection necessary or warranted in their transaction. The
invited “second look” or “another bite” safeguards legal rights. Such a result was unthinkable
prior to the appearance of opt-in provisions.
Do opt-in provisions reflect a new paradigm in arbitration law? Are they evidence of a
new protocol between the courts and the arbitral process? Or, instead, do they indicate basic
party confusion and a conflicted and impractical approach to arbitration that is undesirable and
should be avoided. If protection from bad decisions by arbitrators is the goal, other, less drastic
cures appear to exist.

52

The federal circuit courts are divided on the enforceability of opt-in provisions.145
Despite the schism, the objections to the use of contract in this way are legion. There is little, if
any, evidence of a new paradigm—not any more here than in January 2000 when financial
pundits were heralding a new age of stock investment. Whether by contract or statute, immixing
courts into the arbitral process is a bad idea that threatens the core attributes of arbitration. Old
anxieties cannot be pacified by the illusion of a new day. As Justice Cardozo remarked in the
celebrated Palsgraf case, “Life will have to be made over, and human nature transformed, before
provision so extravagant can be accepted as the norm of conduct, the customary standard to
which behavior must conform.”146

Neither judicializing arbitration nor arbitralized court

procedures are likely to emerge as a new form of arbitration. Fundamental defintional and
conceptual distinctions prevent it. Only the most opportunistic thinking could endorse such
absurdities as a form of adjudication.
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adjudication, they do so in different ways and pursuant to distinct missions. Each has its own
purpose and function. They respond to different social needs. The episodic judicializaiton of
arbitration is a perilous creation because it not only sullies arbitration’s basic character, but it
also invites the process’ deterioration and eventual elimination.147
In arbitration, rights protection is always at odds with the functionality of adjudication.
The provision of de novo review of arbitrator rulings integrates the right of appeal into the
arbitral process and renders it much closer, on a fundamental basis, to judicial proceedings.
Disgruntled parties, therefore, are given an opportunity to express their opposition to the
arbitrators’ determinations beyond complaining about would-be procedural irregularities in
vacatur. Instructing the court of enforcement to undertake a full review of the substance of the
award expresses distrust of the arbitrators and of their ability to interpret and apply the law. It
also raises serious questions about the parties’ motivation for choosing arbitration. The addition
of the opt-in provision alters a material term in the standard and long-standing bargain for
arbitration.

It is difficult to conceive of contemporary arbitration as a mere fact-finding

procedure. Opt-in provision also give judicial proceedings a mythical and unrealistic glow.
Finally, they significantly compromise the finality and effectiveness of arbitration.
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Like the misguided common law grounds, the availability of opt-in judicial merits review
contradicts the express language of the governing statute. As noted earlier, FAA §10 contains no
mention of, and thereby excludes, the judicial supervision of the merits of awards. The FAA is
the law, legislatively enacted. It is not a “default” framework, meant to supplement the exercise
of freedom of contract. Barebones legal regulation is not insignificant because of its economy.
It states basic regulatory principles, important to society and to the law, that are not secondary to
party contract discretion—unless the legislation itself so provides. Moreover, if contract can be
used to increased judicial supervision, logic demands that it can also be used to lessen or
eliminate it. Parties could demand that courts automatically enforce their awards. Such an
approach is likely to generate chaos and confusion. Contract negotiations would establish the
law of arbitration in a completely ad hoc fashion.
The rule of contract freedom provides the strongest support for opt-in provisions. In Volt
Information Sciences, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the judicial task in regard to arbitration
is to enforce arbitration agreements as written by the parties. There, the Court held the parties to
the letter of their agreed-upon arbitral clause despite the eventual consequence of inarbitrability.
The Court modified its position in a subsequent case. In Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman
Hutton, Inc.,148 the Court held that the exercise of contract choice as to the law applicable must
not impede the parties’ reference to arbitration. Opt-in provisions do not defeat the party
agreement to arbitrate, but they do lengthen the arbitral process and could impair or destroy the
process’ conclusiveness.
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A Judicial Addition: The Action to Clarify Awards

The ruling in Hardy v. Walsh Manning Securities, L.L.C.,149 demonstrates the wisdom of
the U.S. Supreme Court’s “emphatic federal policy” favoring arbitration.

As the Court

elaborated the tenets of the policy over the last forty years,150 the Justices seemed to have
understood—before any legislator or commentator—that unequivocal support and intolerance of
deviations were necessary to master the ideological rift and cultural clash between arbitral and
judicial adjudication. Passivity, understanding, and a practice of consensus-building would have
essentially left state and lower federal courts to their own devices. They would quickly have
confected an amalgam of rulings that imposed their authority and separate political values upon
the arbitral process. U.S. society would have thusly become the beneficiary of an ineffective
alternative adjudicatory process, the scattered application of which would not have remedied the
inaccessibility of justice.

While the legislature is the repository of democratic values, the

judiciary’s primary responsibility is to maintain legal civilization and the rule of law by
proclaiming juridical standards.
More specifically, Hardy illustrates the inter-relationship between vacatur for manifest
disregard of the law and the action to clarify an award.151 The Hardy court’s reasoning further
exhibits how misguided both procedures are and how antagonistic their underlying rationale is to
149
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the autonomy and functionality of arbitration. The Hardy circumstances represent nothing more
than the majority’s disagreement with the arbitrators’ application of law.
The majority opinion makes abundantly clear that the court believes that the securities
arbitration tribunal misconstrued and thereby misapplied New York state law. It also makes
clear that the court invoked its “authority to seek a clarification of…[the tribunal’s] intent” in
order to avoid vacating the award on the basis of manifest disregard of the law. In reaching its
determination, the court’s objective appears to have been two-fold: (1) to “afford” the arbitral
tribunal “an opportunity” to avoid vacatur on the basis of manifest disregard (“We are reluctant
to announce that the Award is void outright as written.”); and (2) to avoid imposing a
“substantial financial liability…upon an individual without a clear basis in law.”152 Seeking to
uphold the federal policy in favor of arbitration and to enforce a would-be legally accurate
award, the court seems in the end to have achieved neither objective.
The facts involved an investor who had opened an account with Walsh Manning, a
brokerage firm in New York City.153 Hardy, the investor, claimed that the firm and its agents
misrepresented the value of certain “house stocks” that they encouraged him to buy.154 The
matter was submitted to an NASD arbitration tribunal, which the court described as consisting
“of three members, only one of whom [was] an attorney,” implying that two-thirds of the panel
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may not have understood the applicable law.155 The tribunal decided in favor of the investor,
holding in part that, “Respondents Walsh Manning and Skelly [the CEO of the brokerage firm]
[were]…jointly and severally liable for and shall pay…compensatory damages…based upon the
principles of respondeat superior.”156
It is the tribunal’s reference in the award to respondeat superior that disturbed the
majority.157 In its view, the firm’s CEO and broker were both employees of the firm. Skelly was
not an officer of the company.158 Accordingly, Skelly could not, under applicable New York
law, be held liable for the acts of the broker because both of them were employees: “The
principle that respondeat superior is a form of secondary liability that cannot be imposed upon
the fellow employee of a wrongdoer is certainly well-defined and explicit in New York.”159 In a
word, the majority believed that the arbitral tribunal had misapplied the New York version of
respondeat superior (including the “fellow servant” rule) by holding Skelly liable for the broker’s
conduct.
The majority then undertook an extensive assessment of the district court opinion. The
court below concluded that the award as written should be enforced, although it recognized that
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the arbitral tribunal’s reference to respondeat superior liability was problematic. It then excused
the statement as an imprecise and confusing way to state that the firm and its CEO were “jointly
and severally liable” for the broker’s conduct. The would-be error arose from bad word choice
and grammar. Nonetheless, the award made clear that the firm should pay the investor a sum
certain. The essential determination of liability was unmistakable and enforceable.
The dissent, however, provided the most persuasive and accurate interpretation of the
facts:
In this case, the disputed portion of the arbitrators’ decision simply states:
“Walsh Manning and Skelly be and hereby are jointly and severally
liable…based upon the principles of respondeat superior.” The majority’s
interpretation, while conceivable, ignores the fact that the critical phrase
“based upon the principles of respondeat superior” may simply explain the
basis for Walsh Manning’s joint and several liability, without referring to the
basis for Skelly’s primary liability. Indeed, the phrase may indicate Walsh
Manning’s liability for Skelly’s actions, not just Cassese’s wrongful conduct,
based upon the theory of respondeat superior. In other words, the award may
specify the form of liability, joint and several, while remaining completely
silent as to the underlying claims on which Skelly was actually found liable.
Not only is this a plausible interpretation of the decision, but also a completely
probable one, for Hardy presented substantial evidence during the arbitration
hearing that Skelly, who was Cassese’s direct supervisor, failed to properly
supervise Cassese, that Skelly was personally aware of Cassese’s unauthorized
trading, and that Skelly violated federal securities laws by engaging in direct
market manipulation. 160
It would seem that the judicial policy favoring arbitration would require that courts view
the arbitrators’ ruling in the light most favorable to the enforcement of the award. Because it is,
in fact, quite likely that the reference to respondeat superior only applies to the brokerage firm,
the award could not be challenged on the basis of manifest disregard of the law or remanded by
the court to the arbitrators for clarification. The firm was liable to its customer because its
agents/employees had overreached and violated their fiduciary obligations by failing to properly
160
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supervise and by pushing the customer to buy house stocks. It is indeed difficult to accept the
majority’s conclusion, that “In our case, we have crossed the line from confusion to
inexplicability, and we can discern no reading of the Award that resolves its apparent
contradiction with the law of respondeat superior.”161
According to the majority, “The award indeed contains a fundamental mistake of law.”162
It believed that even “the most liberal reading of the award” could not repair the legally
erroneous conclusion that Skelly was liable under respondeat superior.163 While it accepted the
possibility that the “explicit legal conclusion” may have been “‘a stray and unnecessary
remark,’” “only the Panel [tribunal] can tell us this…”164 In continuing its litany of strained
contradictions, the majority described the standard for vacatur for manifest disregard of the law
(clearly implying that it was satisfied in the instant case) and then concluded in a bout of
remorse: “we are reluctant to announce that the Award is void outright as written.”165
In the words of colloquial parlance, ‘the arbitrators’, says the majority, ‘got the law
wrong and are imposing a substantial liability upon an individual employee. That conclusion
may be true because we have no express statement of its impossibility in the award! The award
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could be read in a more accommodative manner, but we choose not to because the law was,
could, or might have been misapplied by the arbitrators. And, it is a serious matter to impose
liability where it should not lie, even though it’s likely the arbitrators really didn’t do so. We,
therefore, find manifest disregard of the law but we really don’t. We just want the arbitrators to
use better words, our words, and manifestly respect the law on our terms.’ To reach an initial
conclusion: No thinking other then political punditry has ever been more liberated from the
restraints of rationality.
The foregoing “reasoning” stands as the foundation for the court’s next lurch of logic
consecrating its authority to order a clarification:
Although certainly not the normal course of things, we do have the authority to
remand to the Panel for purposes broader than a clarification of the terms of a
specific remedy. That is, we have the authority to seek a clarification of
whether an arbitration panel’s intent in making an award “evidence[s] a
manifest disregard of the law.”…The Panel should be afforded such an
opportunity.…
…Judge Lynch’s [district court judge] fear that remand here “would in effect
require arbitrators to provide explicit and correct legal analyses of their
conclusions—something the law does not require” strikes us as overstated.…In
this case, the Panel chose to make an explicit legal conclusion in the award, a
conclusion that may well be wrong. It should be given the opportunity to
explain themselves [sic] [itself]. We are emphatically opening no floodgates
here. We simply wish for more clarity because we think that substantial
financial liability should not be imposed upon an individual without a clear
basis in law.166
Where should the criticism begin? There are an extraordinary number of problems with
the court’s statements, not the least of which is determining what it is saying and seeking to
accomplish. It is no longer clear at this critical stage in the opinion whether the court still
believes that the arbitrators’ ruling on respondeat superior manifestly disregards the applicable
law. The court says only that the tribunal’s statement may well be wrong. It is unclear what the
166
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court means by its reference to the panel’s intent and how the court would ascertain it and how it
could be a factor in applying the manifest disregard standard. It refers twice to affording the
tribunal an “opportunity” to explain itself on the respondeat superior issue. These statements
suggest that the court not only is commanding the arbitral tribunal to give reasons for its
determination, but also to supply the court with the right reasons in other to avoid vacatur. Judge
Lynch is right about the consequences of remand on this basis; it is well-settled law that, unless
the arbitration agreement provides otherwise, arbitrators are under no legal obligation to give
reasons, let alone the “right” reasons.
The court’s adamant denial of systemic consequence is as implausible as its twisted and
wrong-headed ruling. The ruling does, in fact, have the potential of generating an entire new
sector of vacatur litigation.

Every dissatisfied party will now argue that the arbitrators’

determination was flawed by ambiguity or a lack of clarity in the application of law. It is beyond
cavil that the majority opinion overrides and breaches the levee of arbitrator sovereignty. It is
difficult to say when a sufficient lack of clarity exists or how widespread it needs to be. Does it
pertain only to law or the facts as well? What if the arbitrators don’t agree or see another
problem? Is the majority’s case for an action to clarify based on a lack of clarity, a legal error, or
does it reflect court misconstruction and simple disagreement with the arbitrators?
The court’s final statement douses the flames with kerosene. Does the court have the
authority and basis in law to require “more clarity”? Is lack of clarity manifest disregard of law?
Must the arbitral tribunal rule as the court would in order to avoid vacatur of its determination?
Doesn’t this constitute an in-depth review of the merits and directions from the court to the
arbitrators on how to apply the law? Is it now a rule of arbitration law that arbitrators can only
impose substantial financial liability on individuals when there is “a clear basis in law” to do so?
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What part of FAA §10 says that? Is this manifest disregard of the law in the second degree? The
arbitrators did not manifestly disregard the law, but did not rule as the court would have—‘they
did not get it right’—and, therefore, they need to modify their determination accordingly.
The court then gives the arbitral tribunal specific instructions as to the issues presented
and how they might be resolved in various ways. The approach is extraordinary and leaves even
the most loquacious commentator speechless—nearly. There can be little doubt that the court’s
ruling violates the sovereignty of the arbitrators and the autonomy of the arbitral process. It is a
confusing mishmash of conflicting tendencies that leads ultimately to a pernicious result:
Because the tribunal’s holding could be misunderstood (by someone who misreads it), the court
stymies the arbitration until the arbitrators arrive at what the court see as a substantively correct
legal result.
The dissent properly evaluates the majority’s distorted reasoning: “By remanding to the
arbitration panel for clarification as to the underlying legal basis for liability, the
majority…disregards the well-settled precedent establishing our severely limited review of
arbitration awards.”167 Further, “in ‘wishing for more clarity,’ the majority’s decision overlooks
our limited role in reviewing arbitration decisions.…”168

It underscores how the majority

opinion deviates from well-settled standards: “…[M]ere ambiguity in the award itself is not a
basis for denying confirmation, so long as the award can be interpreted as having a colorable
factual or legal basis.”169
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plausible reading of the award is legally sustainable.”170 In responding specifically to a point
made by the majority, the dissent describes the long-standing judicial practice in terms of
arbitration: “Our goal, then, is not to discern the actual subjective intent of the arbitration panel,
but only to determine if the award can be sustained under any plausible reading.”171
The dissent also criticizes the majority’s muddled view of the inter-action between the
action to clarify awards and manifest disregard of the law. If a court determines that the
arbitrators’ ruling constitutes a manifest disregard of the law, the award is unenforceable. The
governing legal provisions do not give the arbitral tribunal another chance to get it right. The
majority’s position trivializes both the role of the court and the remedial integrity of arbitration.
It also fosters protracted litigation about arbitration. It ignores the parties’ expectations as to
their bargain for arbitration and substitutes a misguided activism for the deference that has
characterized the courts’ relationship with arbitration for so long.

The dissent usefully

emphasizes that the action to clarify an award does have a place in the legal regulation of
arbitration. It is available when the court of enforcement simply does not understand what the
arbitrators in fact held. The lack of understanding does not express disagreement with the
arbitrators’ legal reasoning, but applies to the holding. A failure to clarify would result in the
impossibility of enforcement. According to the precedent, “such a remand is appropriate ‘so that
the court will know exactly what it is being asked to enforce.’”172
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In Brownsville General Hospital,173 the Third Circuit upheld a district court’s decision to
remand an arbitral award to the arbitrator for clarification. The case involved a unionized
employee who had been suspended then terminated because of allegations of sexual
harassment174. Ruling on the employee’s grievance, the arbitrator held that the employee should
be reinstated after completion of agreed-upon counseling.175 The designated therapist, however,
eventually refused to continue working with the employee.176 Reinstatement could not take
place until the designated therapist certified that the employee had completed counseling.177 In
response to the hospital’s attempt to terminate the employee, the union, inter alia, requested that
the arbitrator be asked to assess the unforeseen change of circumstance in light of his prior
ruling.178 The district court agreed, but cautioned the arbitrator not to “revisit the merits of the
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arbitration.”179 The question presented to the arbitrator was also restricted to assessing the
impact of the “therepist’s post-award refusal to continue the counseling relationship.”180
Brownsville has been applauded as exhibiting “a high degree of common sense” and
because it is a practical means of “afford[ing] the parties arbitral justice.” Such praise has been
accompanied by the denigration of the functus officio doctrine, which is the chief legal and
doctrinal barrier to allowing actions for clarification. In order to diminish the doctrine, the
commentators refer for support from no less an authority then Judge Richard Posner of the
Seventh Circuit.

In Chief Judge Posner’s view, a remand to clarify is necessary because

arbitrators are no more infallible than judges.181
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When compared to Hardy, Brownsville is an easy case and, therefore, a bad basis for
making law. Hard-headed lawyer practicality—getting the parties a final and adapted result—is
an attractive solution and rationale, but it would be destructive in the Hardy circumstances. As
to Judge Posner, looking at arbitration through the perspective of the judicial process is almost
always wrong.

The dynamics and objectives of the processes are related but different.

Moreover, the authorities cited suggest that the doctrine of functus officio arose because of the
vulnerability of arbitrators to outside pressure once they had decided the matter. The doctrine
allowed them a means of avoiding attempts to be influenced. The rationale, whether valid or not
historically, demeans arbitrators and is characteristic of the distrust and petty judicial jealousies
that the FAA was meant to eradicate.

It is next to impossible to integrate it into the

contemporary operation and regulation of arbitration. Rather than portray arbitrators as uncouth
and driven by greed and arbitration as an ethically and professionally inferior process of

BP Pipelines, 191 F. Supp. 2d 852, 856, 858 (S.D. Tex. 2002)(declaring the widespread erosion of functus
officio in the federal appellate courts and relying on Excelsior Foundry to question whether the doctrine
even exists in labor arbitration today).

Judge Posner’s five criticisms are: 1) the doctrine deprives arbitral parties of the opportunity to seek
reconsideration of an arbitrator’s decision, creating a gap in our system of private arbitral justice; 2) the
doctrine cloaks arbitrators with an unfair aura of infallibility, since it assumes that there is no politic need to
allow arbitrators to revisit their awards; 3) the doctrine reduces the authority of arbitrators in comparison
with judges and, therefore, reduces the utility of arbitration as an alternative to litigation; 4) the availability
of exceptions to the doctrine tempts arbitral parties to engage in post-award ex parte contacts attempting to
destabilize a final award, creating a behavioral effect that actually undermines the rationale of finality the
doctrine serves; and 5) the doctrine is a product of historical judicial hostility to arbitration. Excelsior
Foundry, 56 F.3d at 846-47.
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adjudication, functus officio today emphasizes the importance of finality in arbitration and the
need to contain the appeal of awards to fundamental procedural irregularities. To philistines, any
latinate phrase can only be anchored in pedantry. Functus officio, as seen from the perspective
of modern arbitration law, is neither obscure or irrelevant; it, in effect, defines and maintains
material elements of the parties’ bargain for arbitration. It fosters justice, efficiency, and finality.

Conclusions

Given these developments in U.S. arbitration practice, how should the world law on
arbitration address the question of the standards for review? The use of party agreement to
create an increased form of judicial supervision that involves the court of enforcement’s
assessment of the merits is easier to dismiss than the action to clarify awards. The integration of
such a standard into the legal framework for regulating arbitration would create havoc in the
system and lead to scattered results, robbing the process of its uniformity and effectiveness. At
the very least, different courts would interpret the same provisions differently and courts would
establish different (perhaps contradictory) approaches to answering the same question. The
governing law contemplates an entirely different standard that must apply if arbitration is to
remain functional. The law reflects a long historical evolution that resulted in legitimating
arbitration and liberating it from its status as a “bastardize” remedy. A critical feature of the
statutory law was the provision for narrow and very limited judicial review. Arbitration can still
be undermined by overly aggressive judicial actions. Supplying an invitation to achieve such an
undesirable result through party freedom of contract is completely counterproductive.
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It

represents the misuse of power and should lead the parties to reconsider their choice of arbitral
adjudication.
The action to clarify awards presents a more subtle and challenging problem. Properly
circumscribed and applied, it could have enormous practical value and salvage an otherwise
sound arbitration from the foible of circumstantial indeterminacy. The Model Law makes it a
function of party choice and agreement, whereas the U.S. common law action is directed to
courts. Given the adversarial character of adjudication and the practicality of enforcement, it is
wiser to embed this decision in the authority of the courts. In fact, it is an action that should only
be invoked by the court of enforcement when it literally does not know what the arbitral tribunal
has determined and ordered the parties to do.
The action to clarify allows a pragmatic answer to a stark choice: enforcement or vacatur
for indefiniteness. It is, of course, impossible to enforce what cannot be known. Vacatur is
expensive in terms of time, costs, and opportunity. The action, however, must be restricted to
clarifying what the court (acting reasonably and in the furtherance of arbitration) does not
understand and it cannot lead the arbitrators to reconsider in any respect the merits of the
litigation. It would need to be codified in the statutory law as a limited exception to the functus
officio doctrine. It should be further defined as a highly limited action to which recourse is had
only in truly exceptional circumstances.
The recent history of the legal regulation of arbitration is characterized by the shifting
between major ideas and purposes.

Until the enactment of the FAA in 1925, legislative

regulation ceded its authority to courts. Courts perceived arbitration as a competitor adjudicatory
process. The conviction among judges was that only trained jurists could render justice in
litigation. The recourse to arbitration, therefore, needed to be restricted and discouraged for both
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the common and individual good. Public order values and responsibilities predominated and
could not be compromised. Lawyers were the servants of the law; they were not beholding to
private mandates. Arbitrators were by and large improperly schooled and lacked any allegiance
to the social order or the law. They were merely merchants who tried to make peace among their
colleagues for a fee.
Thereafter, business interests pushed to change the status quo—at least, for themselves.
From a commercial perspective, judicial adjudication had always been impractical and counterproductive. Lengthy delays, legalistic considerations, and the depletion of resources and energy
made court proceedings undesirable. Choice and self-governance became the watchwords of the
resurgence of arbitration. Proponents of the movement persuaded the federal legislature and a
few state counterparts to surrender their regulatory authority to private agreements. The law
would enforce agreements to arbitrate and the results of the process, but—otherwise—
commercial litigation could be shaped by parties’ choice and become a basically private matter.
Public authority would sustain the process of private adjudication and self-governance at critical
stages.
The expansion of the range of arbitrable disputes from commercial to statutory
disagreements, as well as employment and consumer matters, altered the relationship between
private and public adjudication even more. The functionality and adaptability of arbitration was
attractive to most areas of civil litigation. The autonomy of the arbitral process and of arbitrators
became a central preoccupation of the governing law. Arbitrators were sovereign decisionmakers in terms of the proceeding, the contract, and the dispute. Freedom of contract was
heralded by courts as an absolute value in arbitration. In reality, however, the chief concerns of
legal doctrine was the ability of arbitrators to conduct arbitrations and to decide without the
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interference of courts. Contract freedom was respected as long as it gave effect to the mandate to
arbitrate. The use of adhesion contracts in arbitration illustrates this point.
In effect, in order to guarantee access to a functional form of adjudication, public
sovereign authority delegated the task of adjudication to the machinery of arbitration.

It

conferred substantial authority upon arbitrators and upon party counsel to maintain the
effectiveness and fairness of the process. The practical social need for a workable process of
adjudication trumped the value placed in legal principles and training and in the fairness and
legitimacy borne of rigorous due process. The value of legal rights no longer exceeded the
workings of the process for their implementation. Hollow, symbolic rights no longer had any
currency. The ethic of effectiveness superceded all other considerations in the regulation of
arbitration and adjudication.
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